Given people's interest in all things California, the novelty of the recall mechanism, and the presence of a bona fide action hero in the race, it is not surprising that the 2003 California recall election attracted an inordinate amount of national attention. The circus-like atmosphere should not, however, obscure the interesting implications of the recall election for our understanding of the broader phenomenon of strategic voting. We argue that partisans faced two different strategic voting scenarios in California, with Democrats confronting a slightly more subtle set of criteria and circumstances than Republicans. Drawing on individual-level survey data designed to gauge candidate affect and second-choice preferences, we find that strategic voting was common (although by no means unanimous) among those whose preferences placed them in a position to cast such a strategic vote.
INTRODUCTION
Besides serving as a humorous aside for political observers and the general public, the 2003 California recall election provides an excellent opportunity to study the broader phenomenon of strategic voting. The particulars of this special election reinforce the commonsense notion that knowledge about the influence of choice sets and rules on voting behavior and electoral outcomes is critical for understanding representativeness and accountability. Put a slightly different way, the idea that voters might opt to support a second or third choice in light of counting rules, thresholds, runoffs, and other such mechanical features of the election ought to be of interest to every citizen in every democratic polity. Moreover, the wide array of election provisions within the United States and across the world gives us every incentive to create a broader, more systematic accounting for the extent and character of strategic voting. The uniqueness of the California recall election is, therefore, more draw than drawback as we seek to increase our knowledge about strategic voting.
This article asks what we can learn about the magnitude and character of strategic voting from the California recall election. On October 7, 2003, California voters faced a referendum on removing an incumbent governor followed by a replacement election to determine a new governor if the incumbent were to be voted out. The nature of the election was not especially unique, but the simultaneity of the sequencing was. Furthermore, the strategic situation facing Democrats and Republicans was quite distinct, and party elites acted accordingly. We posit that strategic voting was fairly common among those for whom it was an option but that information and candidate preference structures limited its scope. The article proceeds by reviewing the basics of strategic voting before offering a more detailed discussion of the California context. We then turn to our own data-a September 20 to 22 survey of 1,010 likely voters from California complete with vote intention, candidate favorability, and second-choice items-and propose both descriptive and multivariate analyses of strategic voting. 1 The results are presented in the penultimate section, and we conclude by recapping the main findings and expanding on the lessons of the California recall for strategic voting writ large.
THE BASICS OF STRATEGIC VOTING WHAT IS STRATEGIC VOTING?
Although we have little interest in providing yet another review of the voluminous literature on strategic voting, it is important for us to highlight a few aspects of this literature that bear most directly on our study. First, we would be remiss if we did not offer a clear definition.
Broadly defined, strategic voting is "voting for [someone] other than one's preferred party or candidate in order to increase the probability of a satisfactory overall outcome" (Galbraith & Rae, 1989, p. 126) . We assume that the most common instance of strategic voting (also referred to as tactical or sophisticated voting) is when a person votes for a candidate or party that is not her first choice to avoid wasting her vote and facilitating the election of her least preferred candidate (see Alvarez & Nagler, 2000; Blais & Nadeau, 1996; Blais & Turgeon, in press; Cox, 1997; Galbraith & Rae, 1989; Heath & Evans, 1994; Lanoue & Bowler, 1992) .
WHAT AFFECTS STRATEGIC VOTING?
Beyond this simple definition, however, the context, extent, and frequency of strategic voting seem to vary depending on a myriad of factors. Most notably, scholars have repeatedly observed that electoral rules and levels of support affect voting for the candidates (Downs, 1957; Enelow & Hinich, 1984; Riker, 1962) . This point is cogently argued, for example, in the widely cited work of Cox (1997) , who offers separate analyses of strategic voting under single-member single-ballot, multimember district, and single-member dual-ballot systems. 2 More specifically, Cox contends that in multimember district systems, strategic voting fades in jurisdictions with more than five seats because information costs are prohibitive. 3 In those districts where five or fewer seats are up for grabs, however, strategic voting might entail deserting weaker candidates or parties, or it might entail deserting strong parties when their candidates are safely in and voters have a much greater chance of affecting the outcome for one of the "marginal" parties (Cox, 1997, p. 121) .
Similarly, electoral rules routinely interact with candidate standing in U.S. presidential primaries. For instance, Bartels (1988) suggests two strategic voting possibilities in these contests. First, a voter might choose his second-or third-choice candidate based on their perceived chances for winning the fall general election (electability). Second, voters may focus more specifically on the candidates' probabilities of winning the nomination, using information about a candidate's successes in past primary elections as well as their anticipated success in future primary races to inform their vote choice (viability). Setting aside the peculiar arrangements of presidential primaries, it is also the case that even for some Senate, House, or gubernatorial primaries there is a potential inclination toward casting a ballot for someone besides your most preferred candidate if winners who gain less than 50% of the vote are forced into a runoff with the second-leading votegetter (Hershey & Beck, 2003; Keefe & Hetherington, 2003) . 4 In addition to rules and standing, we also believe it is likely that strategic voting depends on the information context of the election and the characteristics of the electorate. On the first of these, it is likely that strategic voting is more common when the campaign and candidates draw significant news media coverage (Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino, & Rohde, 1992) . This creates an information environment in which voters have the facts, or at least believe they have the facts, necessary to cast a vote for a second-or even third-favorite candidate. The second and related influence is the relative ability of a given electorate to acquire and process the political and contextual information necessary to cast a strategic vote (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995) . It is reasonable to infer that more highly educated and affluent electorates are, ceteris paribus, more likely to vote strategically.
HOW OFTEN DOES STRATEGIC VOTING OCCUR?
Exactly how many voters cast strategic ballots is not only determined by the context of the election and the electoral rules but also by how we measure the phenomenon. Emblematic of the current debate is contradictory research on the 1987 British general election. Niemi, Whitten, and Franklin (1992) find one sixth of the electorate acted strategically in this contest, whereas Alvarez and Nagler (2000) peg the figure at 7.2%. This discrepancy-16% to 7%-is not unusual and highlights the need for synthesis.
It is interesting to note that much of the debate appears to center on the correct denominator, and some common ground seems to be emerging on this matter. Recent research makes a convincing case that measuring strategic voting must focus on those voters who have a legitimate strategic choice. Blais and Nadeau (1996) , whose model predicting strategic voting drops from consideration respondents "for whom strategic voting is not an option" (p. 41), argue this forcefully. In particular, respondents whose first choice appears more likely to win than their second choice have no incentive to vote strategically and are not considered by Blais and Nadeau. It is interesting that only 20% of Blais and Nadeau's full sample encounter a strategic choice, with 30% of these (6% of the total sample) voting strategically. Although we prefer the Blais and Nadeau formulation, in this article we report strategic voting as a percentage of both the entire electorate and that portion of the electorate facing a strategic choice.
ESTIMATING MODELS OF STRATEGIC VOTING
Even a cursory review of the relevant literature amply demonstrates that it is difficult to find data that bring definitions and explanatory variables to life. Blais and Nadeau (1996) observe that studies of strategic voting seem to fall into three categories. The first set of studies measures strategic voting by responses to surveys. For example, in their study of the 1987 British elections, Heath and Evans (1994) measured "tactical voting through one response to a forced-choice question, namely the response, 'I really preferred another party but it had no chance of winning in this constituency'" (p. 559). Lanoue and Bowler (1992) use an almost identical measure in their analysis of strategic voting. In the same ballpark (but with a slight twist), Niemi et al. (1992) also use the respondent's characterization of her vote to measure strategic voting but expand the set of response options that count as a strategic vote.
The second category encompasses aggregate-level analyses and is dominated by models of British elections. The common attempt here is to estimate strategic voting by looking at differences in votes for parties among various constituencies between elections (Galbraith & Rae, 1989) . The most ambitious of these calculate "maximum likelihood estimates of the flows in each constituency" and offer "flow-ofthe-votes" matrices (Johnston & Pattie, 1991, p. 97) .
Third, and finally, some studies consider both a voter's preferences and outside measures of the candidate's or party's chances of winning (Abramson et al., 1992; Alvarez & Nagler, 2000; Bartels, 1988; Blais & Nadeau, 1996; Cain, 1978) . "This approach tries to model strategic voting directly as the objective differences between the stated vote and the preference rankings of individuals or the subjective differences between the vote cast and a rank-ordering of the parties or candidates" (Alvarez & Nagler, p. 63) .
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Each of these approaches has its flaws. Asking a respondent whether or not she voted strategically is not an optimal way to measure strategic voting. Fundamentally, a survey question is not the same as a vote, and nonrandom factors that can influence respondents can also bias results. Of course, aggregate-level data have been effectively introduced to reduce the misreporting that plagues the use of individual-level survey data, but using aggregate-level data to infer individual-level behavior has well-known problems that are only partially ameliorated by methodological corrections (King, 1997; Robinson, 1950) . Thus, although we believe there is value in these aggregate and combined approaches, we also think the ideal data set would consist primarily of more reliable, individual-level data. Toward this end, we employ a more expansive survey that is detailed in the "Data and Design" section.
Given our reliance on survey data, can we identify and operationalize a coherent set of independent variables that might plausibly be thought to drive strategic voting? Several possibilities stand out:
1. The intensity of voters' preferences (or differences in their utility functions) for candidates appears to affect the decision to vote strategically (Abramson et al., 1992; Blais & Nadeau, 1996) . 2. Partisanship might also have an impact on strategic voting. Lanoue and Bowler (1992) argue that under certain conditions, "those with very strong partisan ties may be less likely to abandon their party regardless of national and constituency electoral circumstances" (p. 143). In other words, party elites in Britain would not necessarily benefit from encouraging their supporters to cast strategic votes because although such a vote might benefit them in some constituencies, it could hurt in others. 3. Blais and Turgeon (in press) recently demonstrated that political sophistication is a key independent variable affecting one's ability to predict which candidate will come in third, an appraisal critical for casting a strategic vote in many circumstances. Although political sophistication is not the same as education (see Luskin, 1990 ), Blais and Turgeon's work is consistent with the widely held belief that people with higher degrees of educational attainment are more likely to vote strategically (Alvarez & Nagler, 2000; Lanoue & Bowler, 1992) . 7 Others suggest that alternative resource attributes-especially income and age-might also influence the probability of strategic voting (Merolla, 2002) .
We therefore propose an initial model of strategic voting as a function of candidate ranking, partisanship, and resources (education, income, and age). Other factors, although somewhat underdeveloped in the extant literature, undoubtedly warrant consideration as either theoretically independent predictors or as control variables. Several of these-including gender, race, and ethnicity-occur to us as particularly intriguing possibilities for the California recall and are specified in greater detail later.
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STRATEGIC VOTING IN THE CALIFORNIA RECALL ELECTION
The question at hand, of course, is to what extent did voters in California opt for their second-and third-choice options when voting in the recall election? Given the reputed influence of institutional arrangements, it is important to place the election in context so that we might generate testable hypotheses about voter behavior. In fact, if one reviews the particulars of the California recall, it is akin to two separate yet interdependent strategic voting circumstances. The first circumstance, the recall of Governor Gray Davis, most closely resembles Australia's instant runoff or Louisiana's so-called nonpartisan primary. Ironically, the key to understanding the strategic circumstance of recalling Davis is the nature of the second ballot. If the recall were to succeed, a second round of voting would occur with Democratic Lieutenant Governor Cruz Bustamante substituting in for the eliminated Democrat, Davis. Democratic voters thus needed to consider the possible outcome of the second ballot when deciding how they should vote on the first ballot. Those disliking Davis but disliking potential GOP replacements even more might support Davis to avoid electing a second-ballot Republican. Similarly, those who preferred Bustamante to Davis but preferred any Democrat to the potential GOP replacements might support Davis to avoid electing a second-ballot Republican.
Among Democratic elites, the initial reaction to the recall vote was quite simple. After the requisite signatures had been certified and the election received a green light, Democratic Party officials adopted the mantra of "no" on the recall and attempted to dissuade any Democratic candidates from appearing on the second ballot. Their message was that the election was "an attempted coup by 'extreme rightwingers'" (Polman, 2003) . This strategy began to unravel when bodybuilder turned movie star Arnold Schwarzenegger declared his candidacy, and Daryll Issa, a wealthy conservative Republican who had financed the recall effort, dropped out of the race. The threat of a referendum on Davis with the popular Schwarzenegger waiting in the wings unnerved Democrats and led to the entry of Bustamante.
The Democrats, however, were able to discourage any credible, mainstream candidates from joining Bustamante on the second ballot. Some Democratic advisors then advanced a position of no on the recall and Bustamante on the second ballot. But this had some rather glaring inconsistencies, as even high profile Democrats pointed out. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) complained, "It's somehow difficult to say, 'Don't vote for the recall, but if you do, vote for me.' There is some hypocrisy in that" (Polman, 2003) . Senator Joe Lieberman (D-CT) added, "I'm against the recall. . . . But I think people ought to have a choice between Arnold Schwarzenegger and Larry Flynt" (Fournier, 2003) .
Nevertheless, Democratic strategy steadily began to change to the unified message of no and Cruz. On August 18, 2003, major support for this strategy began to coalesce as the California State Employees Association-representing nearly 140,000 state workers-the California Association of Highway Patrolmen, the California Conference of Carpenters, and the state legislature's Latino caucus endorsed the no on recall/yes on Bustamante strategy (Sheppard, 2003) . By midSeptember, state Democratic Party delegates met to endorse the no and Cruz strategy, with Davis and Bustamante appearing together for the first time since Bustamante entered the race (Werner, 2003) .
The problem for the Democratic Party, then, was to persuade Bustamante supporters to vote against the recall even though such a vote might deny them of their first choice.
10 This required Democratic elites to disseminate a strategic vote message in a very difficult environment. Ordinarily, message dissemination is plagued by politi-cal indifference and inattentiveness. Here, less attentive voters were still tough to reach, whereas more attentive voters had reason to ignore elite cues and vote according to their own preferences. As UCBerkeley professor Bruce Cain observed, Even though the official line is no and Cruz, the line on the street with a certain number of voters is going to be yes and Cruz. . . . They're not dumb and they know they can only get Cruz if they vote yes and Cruz. (Marelius, 2003) In addition, the incentive for Democrats to vote strategically could have been conditioned by their perception about whether Republican voters would vote strategically. That is, the belief among Democrats that Schwarzenegger could defeat Bustamante might have been contingent upon their perceptions of whether McClintock supporters would defect in favor of the more electable Schwarzenegger.
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From this exposition, it is clear that the analogy between the California recall and the Australian and Louisianan systems should not be pushed too far for two reasons. First, in the California recall election, the first-round candidate can never, by definition, appear on the second ballot. Second, in California the field of candidates expands rather than contracts for the second election. Still, the question of whether or not your second-round candidate can win is, potentially, a major factor in how you vote in the first round.
The second strategic voting circumstance for the California recall-how to vote on the second ballot-most closely resembles a nonpartisan, single member, simple plurality election. The Democrats managed this situation by limiting second-ballot candidates to Bustamante. Republicans, however, were not so fortunate. The entrance of several credible GOP candidates besides Schwarzeneggerbusinessman and Los Angeles Olympic Chairman Peter Ueberroth, businessman Bill Simon, and State Senator Tom McClintock-forced party elites to provide cues (some necessarily cryptic) to the rank and file. Many Republican leaders in the state publicly supported Schwarzenegger and encouraged Ueberroth, Simon, and McClintock to drop out. But although Ueberroth and Simon did leave the race, McClintock remained. This left conservative Republican voters with the opportunity to either vote for McClintock, who trailed by dou-ble digits in the polls (see Figure 2 ), or to cast a strategic vote for Schwarzenegger.
As suggested above, whether or not McClintock supporters would defect to Schwarzenegger depended on several key factors: (a) their perception of McClintock's chances of winning, 12 (b) the intensity of their preference for McClintock compared to Schwarzenegger or other candidates, and (c) their awareness of (and responsiveness to) cues offered by party elites, who were encouraging GOPers to go with their best hope of recapturing the governorship.
Our initial expectation is that strategic voting in California will be extensive but limited for several reasons. First, strategic voting always figures to be limited because of the information requirements necessary to cast such a ballot. Even in a high profile race like the California recall, voters are unlikely to be attentive and informed enough to vote strategically. Second, voters were unfamiliar with the ballot they confronted in the California recall election. Without a precedent, it seems likely that voters would opt for the safest option, which would be to vote their rank-order preference. Third, the relatively brief campaign period (approximately 6 weeks) further reduces the chance that voters had the requisite information to act on the Democrats' no and Cruz strategy. This circumstance was exacerbated by fluctuations in the polls (see Figures 1 and 2) , which further clouded the information environment. Fourth and finally, the intensity of negative feelings toward Davis, as registered in both the recall movement and in the approval ratings of public polls, creates another reason to doubt that Democrats would respond to the entreaties of party officials. for Gray Davis, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Cruz Bustamante, and Tom McClintock as well as second-choice questions (e.g., "Who is your second choice for governor?"). One might object to our using preelection vote intention instead of the actual vote as the basis for constructing our measure of strategic voting. Voters' preelection preferences, however, correlate extremely well with their actual votes (according to National Election Studies data from 1980 to 2000, the correlation coefficient between presidential preference and the vote is 0.90). This presumed relationship is buttressed by the reasonably close match between the aggregate distribution of the final vote and the survey's preelection estimate of the vote. More generally, the survey's extensive and unique data on candidate preferences and our desire to avoid using respondent recall measures of actual voting behavior persuade us to accept the preelection vote intent item.
As detailed earlier, we believe there are two kinds of strategic voting in the California recall election. First, Democrats who preferred Bustamante to Davis (as determined by their relative favorability ratings) but voted against recalling the governor are strategic voters. Conversely (and obviously), those who preferred Davis and voted against the recall, and those who favored Bustamante and voted to recall Davis, cannot be categorized as strategic voters. There are, of course, other combinations and possibilities for Democratic voters, 14 but none of these amounted to more than a small proportion of the overall electorate.
Second, Republicans who preferred a non-Schwarzenegger GOP candidate but said they were voting for Schwarzenegger can be classified as strategic voters. The most common version of this scenario is the McClintock voter who supported Schwarzenegger to ensure the defeat of the Democratic threat on the second ballot, Bustamante. 15 We thus have a dichotomous measure of strategic voting that encompasses two very different political contexts. This measure allows us to gauge the magnitude of strategic voting in the California recall election as well as the relationship between strategic voting and demographic and attitudinal variables. It is, in short, the critical dependent variable. When specifying our multivariate models of strategic voting, however, we estimate separate equations for Bustamante and Schwarzenegger strategic voting so as not to inadvertently squash effects that may exist for only one context. More formally, we first use a simple logistic regression estimator for the following model: (Republican strategic voting) i = α + β 1 (voted in 2002 gubernatorial election) + β 2 (Democratic identifier) + β 3 (Republican identifier) + β 4 (income between $50K and $100K) + β 5 (income more than $100K) + β 6 (less than high school education) + β 7 (college degree or higher) + β 8 (African American) + β 9 (Hispanic) + β 10 (male) + β 11 (distance between first and second preference) + ε i .
The Democratic strategic voting model is specified and estimated identically. The independent variables are, with one exception, binary and straightforward. The exception is the calculation of distance between the respondent's first-and second-favorite candidate, which is derived by subtracting the 1 to 5 favorability ratings of the respondent's top-two candidates. 16 The expectations we have for the independent variables are similarly straightforward. We expect that in-party partisans are more likely to engage in strategic voting than are independents and outparty partisans. For example, we presume that Republicans who rate McClintock first are more likely to actually vote for Schwarzenegger than are independents or Democrats who hold similar preferences.
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This follows from Zaller's (1992) theory that partisans are much more likely to respond to elite, in-party cues. We also expect those respondents having characteristics indicative of greater civic skills-higher educational attainment, greater income-to be more likely to vote strategically (following Verba et al., 1995) . In addition, we expect respondents who voted in the last election to be more likely to receive and act on strategic cues than nonvoters, so we include the selfreported measure of voting in the 2002 gubernatorial election. Perhaps most obviously, we expect voters who see little difference between their top-two candidates to be, all other things equal, more likely to vote strategically (Downs, 1957) .
Aside from these influences, a few other possible effects need to be accounted for in the model. First, we expect that Hispanic voters are slightly less likely to vote strategically because the recall election presents them with a historic opportunity to elect a Hispanic governor.
18 Second, we suspect that women and African Americans may be slightly more likely to vote strategically because (a) they are core Democratic constituencies and as such are more likely to adhere to party messages, and (b) they are more sensitive to issues of fairness and procedural order and are, therefore, more likely to oppose the recall. We therefore estimate the models with control variables for Hispanic, female, and African American voters.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Although this analysis does not assume a detailed familiarity with the 2003 California recall election, one cannot completely appreciate strategic voting without understanding the particular ebb and flow of the race. Figures 1 and 2 present the results of all available public polls on the recall and second ballot questions, respectively. Figure 1 demonstrates that sentiment against Governor Davis (and in favor of the recall) peaked at about 60% in August as the election was confirmed and candidates began to formally declare for the second ballot. Things improved slightly for Davis in early September with support for the recall receding to about 53%. It was at this point that many predicted Davis would save his job, citing the Democrats'10-point edge in statewide party registration and the concerted earned media strategy against overturning the election of 2002. But then, sentiment in favor of the recall surged upwards to about 56% by early October, where it stayed until Election Day. Figure 2 indicates that by mid-August, as the main players in the race became known to the public, Schwarzenegger held a 5 to 6 point lead over Bustamante on the second ballot. Schwarzenegger's early lead seemed to be a function of celebrity, however, and Bustamante edged ahead as summer turned to fall. In fact, between August 15 and September 23, Bustamante led in five of six available statewide polls. Furthermore, his lead was often quite sizable, varying from 2 to 13 points.
Two occurrences in mid-to late September changed the dynamics of the race. The first was the nationally televised, 90-minute candidate debate on September 24. Schwarzenegger more than held his own in this matchup against Bustamante, Green Party candidate Pete Camejo, media gadfly Arianna Huffington, and fellow Republican McClintock. Although the debate was derided in the news media as "more circus than brawl" (Kasindorf & Ritter, 2003, p. 3A) , there was clearly a sense among media pundits and those who watched the debate that Schwarzenegger had exceeded expectations, whereas Bustamante had not. For example, a CNN poll after the debate showed 54% thought Schwarzenegger had won compared to only 18% for Bustamante.
It is interesting to note for our purposes that Bustamante offered little more than a token appeal for strategic voting during the course of the debate:
Bustamante was also the only candidate to express opposition to the October 7 recall election, in which voters will first decide whether to toss Democratic Gov. Gray Davis and then pick a replacement should he be recalled. "I think the recall is a terrible idea. I think it's bad for democracy. I think it's bad for our state," he said. But Bustamantewhose announced campaign strategy is to urge Californians to vote "No on Recall, Yes on Bustamante"-mentioned his opposition to the recall just once and made no case for keeping Davis. He also said he agreed with the other candidates "that there's some good that could come from this as a result." (CNN Staff, 2003) The second event (or, more properly, series of events) was the publication by the Los Angeles Times of sexual harassment allegations against Schwarzenegger. These stories ran from October 2 to 5 and featured detailed retelling of stories by a number of women who claimed that Schwarzenegger had accosted them. Although the allegations undoubtedly proved embarrassing to the actor turned politician, there is more than a little evidence suggesting a voter backlash against the 11th hour revelations. For example, according to PBS's Online NewsHour:
The decision to publish the articles . . . has apparently taken a toll on the Times' relationship with its readers. The newspaper has received a deluge of angry letters, e-mails and phone calls from readers and over 1,000 people cancelled their subscriptions in protest, according to an Oct. 5 Times article. (NewsHour Staff, 2003) Other anecdotal accounts corroborate this sentiment. Furthermore, the polls show little change in the horse race, which Schwarzenegger clearly dominated by early October. More generally, Figure 2 also shows that neither McClintock nor Bustamante lost much support during late September and early October, indicating that (a) Schwarzenegger's gains came primarily from undecided voters or supporters of also-ran candidates, and (b) there may not have been much strategic voting among either Republican or Democratic partisans.
With this overview as our backdrop, Tables 1 to 5 focus on the Baselice & Associates September 20 to 22 poll. Table 1 presents information on feelings toward the main candidates in the recall campaign. As might be expected, Governor Davis is viewed quite unfavorably (31% favorable and 63% unfavorable for a net rating of -32), with 49% saying they have strongly unfavorable feelings toward him. Only 6% do not have an opinion on Davis. By contrast, Schwarzenegger is viewed favorably (+19), with only 13% having no opinion of him. It is interesting to note that the electorate is ambivalent toward Bustamante (-2) and quite favorable toward McClintock (+20).
In Table 2 , we see the results from the recall and second ballot questions are in line with the election result and as such are not particularly positive for Davis. Overall, 54% of registered voters favor the recall, whereas 40% oppose.
The second ballot question shows 27% supporting Schwarzenegger, 31% Bustamante, 12% McClintock, 9% Ueberroth, 2% Simon, 2% Huffington, 1% Camejo, and 14% saying they are undecided. The ballot is obviously skewed by the presence of undecided voters. Still, the fundamentals appear sound: If you assume Ueberroth and Simon supporters go against Bustamante, Schwarzenegger is the leader even before the debate and the Los Angeles Times onslaught.
The potential for strategic voting is broached in Table 3 . Initially, we see the results from a pair of two-way ballot questionsSchwarzenegger versus Bustamante, McClintock versus Bustamante, and Ueberroth versus Bustamante. In a one-on-one matchup, Schwarzenegger defeats Bustamante by 9 points, 50% to 41%. Bustamante, however, defeats McClintock by 4 points, 46% to 42%, and is essentially tied with Ueberroth, 44% to 43%. Two observations, both consistent with the thinking of almost all pundits and scholars, merit mention here: (a) Schwarzenegger obviously has more statewide appeal than McClintock (or Ueberroth), and (b) the pres- ence of multiple Republican candidates hurt GOP chances for winning the second ballot.
If one examines the Schwarzenegger versus Bustamante two-way ballot preferences among McClintock supporters, it is clear that a strategic withdrawal by McClintock would have greatly benefited Schwarzenegger. Eighty-three percent of McClintock voters would have supported Schwarzenegger in a two-way matchup with Bustamante, with only 11% going to the lieutenant governor. This means that 10% of Californians were McClintock backers who would have voted for Schwarzenegger in a two-way race with Bustamante (only 1% were McClintock voters who would support Bustamante in a two-way). In other words, McClintock keeps the second ballot race from being a solid win for Schwarzenegger (37% to 32% for Bustamante on the second ballot). For Simons' supporters, the results are similar, but for Ueberroth backers the story is a bit more balanced. These respondents split their second-choice and two-way ballots evenly between Schwarzenegger and Bustamante. In addition to showing the two-way ballot results, Table 3 also presents items from the survey that suggest Schwarzenegger, McClintock, and Ueberroth supporters approved of strategic behavior on the part of their candidates. Fifty-nine percent of Schwarzenegger backers and, more importantly, 67% of McClintock voters said their man should withdraw if things looked hopeless. For Ueberroth supporters, a bare majority (50%) takes this position. More direct evidence on strategic voting intent is offered in Table 4 , which cross-tabulates the recall vote intentions by second-ballot preference. Only 14% of Bustamante supporters favor the recall, whereas 83% oppose. This means that only 1% of the total vote is comprised of Bustamante voters who are defecting from the Democratic Party's position. Davis was getting about all he could from Bustamante supporters, and he was still losing.
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More generally, the Baselice poll allows us to estimate that 19% of the California electorate intended to cast a strategic vote in the recall election. Overall, 8% cite Bustamante as their first choice but say they will vote for Davis (against the recall), whereas 11% cite McClintock as their first choice but say they will vote for Schwarzenegger. This 19% is somewhat misleading, however, as only 56% of the electorate had the potential to vote strategically (Blais & Nadeau, 1996) . Using 56% as the denominator, we find that almost 35% of potentially strategic voters actually behaved strategically. Interestingly, a relatively higher proportion of Democrats (57%) intended to cast a strategic vote than Republicans (27%). Having said this, many more Re- publicans indicated a willingness to cast a strategic vote if (a) one of the GOP candidates (McClintock) looked to be out of it, and (b) additional votes were needed to defeat the least preferred second-ballot candidate, Bustamante. Given the extent of apparently strategic voting, it is important to examine the factors driving this behavior. Table 5 presents logistic regression models for Republican, Democratic, and overall strategic voting. 19 Two sets of models are estimated: for all respondents and only for those who were actually in a position to cast a strategic vote. This is not only a theoretically important distinction but also a practical one: models based on all respondents can conflate strategic voting with support for McClintock or Bustamante because supporters of those candidates are the only ones in a position to cast a strategic vote. Following the explanatory logic outlined in the design section, the total column for those with strategic voting potential examines the effects of our independent variables on all manner of strategic voting and confirms the marginal influence of gender, partisanship, and income. We also see that the perceived distance between first-and second-choice candidates has a negative but statistically insignificant impact on strategic voting.
The individual models for the two distinct kinds of strategic voting are of much more value, however, because some of our explanatory variables might work at cross-purposes depending on the context (e.g., Republican and Democratic self-identification). Let us again focus on the models for those who were in a position to cast a strategic vote, which offer slightly more conservative estimates of the variables'effects on strategic voting. For Bustamante voters, only partisan identification correlated significantly with strategic voting. That is, identifying as a Democrat had a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood that one would cast a "No and Cruz" vote, whereas identifying as a Republican had almost no effect. Contrary to expectations, education, income, and distance between first-and second-choice candidates all failed to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. There is reason, though, to believe that Republican identification is picking up some of the disaffection with Davis in this model, obscuring the effects of our candidate distanceaffect measure. Still, the main finding is that groups one would normally expect to pick up on the Democratic Party's strategic voting cues-the more affluent and highly educated, seniors, and perhaps ethnic minorities-did so only at the margins for the recall election. Notably, the absence of an independent effect among Hispanic voters must be disappointing for Democrats, especially because Hispanics were aggressively targeted during the short campaign. Instead, only partisan identifiers heeded the call.
For Schwarzenegger and the Republicans, GOP identification has close to a statistically significant influence on strategic voting (p = 0.06) among those in a position to vote strategically. Democratic identification depresses the tendency to vote strategically but not at conventional levels of statistical significance. Also bordering conventional levels of statistical significance are issue distance and income effects. Strategic voting declined among those who saw a great distance between their first choice (McClintock) and their second choice (typically Schwarzenegger), whereas making more than $100,000 a year correlated with an increased likelihood of strategic voting. Furthermore, in marked contrast to the Democratic model, men were significantly more likely to cast a strategic vote for Schwarzenegger. Put another way, it was not just Republican partisans who picked up on the notion that they could get their second choice (Schwarzenegger) if they defected from their long-shot first-choice candidate (McClintock). More affluent, male voters also behaved strategically on the second ballot. These relationships are, as expected, much stronger in the models of all respondents.
DISCUSSION
Before the 1990s, California had a reputation as something of a bellwether. Legislative reforms in California have served as a model for the professionalization movement across the country. Referenda and initiatives, long part of the political landscape in California, have become increasingly common elsewhere. Perhaps most obviously, presidential candidates in the 20th century rarely won the White House without carrying the Golden State, partly because of the state's treasure trove of electoral votes and partly because of a demographic and political makeup that mirrored that of the United States as a whole. The exits of favorite sons Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan from the national scene and the self-immolation of a series of Republican statewide candidates, however, produced a perception that the state has undergone a demonstrable lurch to the left since 1990. Ironically, this perception of California's move away from the mainstream has caused many to dismiss as idiosyncratic some of the more intriguing (and conservative) political developments in California during the past 12 years: the movements to deny state benefits to children of illegal immigrants, establish English-only requirements for the public schools, and designate certain public-policy budgets off limits to legislative predation.
From this perspective, one might question whether the California recall movement provides any generalizable results. We believe this assumption of California exceptionalism is overstated, however, and think the recipe of public cynicism coupled with recall provisions for elected state officials in 17 other states might prove a powerful elixir. More to the point, the California recall experience differs only slightly from other strategic voting contexts. There is no reason to think it will not be repeated somewhere soon.
Our study thus provides information that is both immediately and broadly relevant. In the narrowest sense, the data demonstrate that although a significant proportion of Bustamante voters supported Davis in the recall, overall support for Bustamante was not wide enough to save the hapless governor. Moreover, it seems safe to say that emotion against Davis was more compelling than the desire to elect a Democrat over any and all alternatives. We would add that an underappreciated dynamic here may be the perception of threat: If the Republican alternative to Davis or Bustamante had been unacceptable to voters who have made a habit of voting for Democrats for statewide office, Californians would have been more likely to listen to the strategic exhortations of the Democratic establishment. But Arnold Schwarzenegger appeared to defuse much of the potential anxiety about his candidacy during the debate. In all likelihood, this doomed Davis.
On the Republican side of the ledger, we find that strategic voting was relatively less common, undoubtedly owing to the favorable standing of the GOP candidates. Besides Republican partisans, we also find that men (those earning more than $100,000 a year) and those who did not see a great difference between their first-and second-choice candidates were significantly more likely to abandon McClintock in favor of Schwarzenegger.
More broadly, the dynamics of the recall campaign worked against the strategic voting exhortations of the Democrats. In addition to the difficulty of informing and persuading voters to support positions that could lead to the defeat of their most preferred candidate (Bustamante), the data suggest that potential Bustamante supporters favored Davis as their second choice only barely or not at all. All of this points to the dilemma of strategic voting: Voters could clearly effectuate different outcomes if they engaged in strategic voting, but information requirements on one hand and complex perceptions and ratings of the candidates on the other hand reduce potential vote shifts. In California, the two-stage ballot and existence of multiple (and contradictory) strategic voting possibilities further muddied the situation. Still, strategic voting in the recall did occur. Furthermore, although limited strategic voting is often taken as a sign that voters are irrational or ignorant, in the California recall, strategic voting levels suggest voters were quite rational and that they simply liked Schwarzenegger and McClintock more than Bustamante and (especially) Davis.
NOTES
1. Likely voters are estimated based on the expressed level of interest in the recall campaign. 2. Within these discussions, Cox (1997) further subdivides strategic contexts faced by voters. For example, in discussing Australia's alternative vote system (or the instant runoff, as some refer to it), Cox presumes that more information would be needed by voters to make a strategic vote as compared to other single-member single-ballot systems such as the simple plurality election.
3. "A voter requires more information to become confident that a given list is really out of the running as M [seats] increase" (Cox, 1997, p. 122) .
4. States such as Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Texas have such runoff provisions for party primaries (CRS Report for Congress, 1998).
5. To decipher respondent preferences, Alvarez and Nagler (2000) estimate "the voter's position on the issues relative to the party and characteristics of the vote" (p. 65). For Abramson et al. (1992) and Blais and Nadeau (1996) , feeling thermometers are used to gauge respondent preferences. In our model, as we discuss later, we use a positive-negative feelings scale to determine candidate preferences.
6. "The propensity to vote strategically should be higher, the lower the intensity of preference for the first choice over the second and the greater the intensity of preference for the second over the third" (Blais & Nadeau, 1996, p. 45) . We should point out that there is contrary evidence on this claim, as Lanoue and Bowler (1992) find that "dislike of the winning party (HATE) has no apparent influence" (p. 145) on strategic voting.
7. Although we do not have a direct measure of political sophistication from our survey, we believe education serves as a reasonable (although flawed) surrogate. Education can serve as an indirect way to estimate a voter's expectations about the outcome of a race, particularly if party elites are putting out information that encourages the casting of a strategic vote. Strategic voting is complicated, and information costs are typically high (Cox 1997) ; thus, it makes sense that education, as a proxy for political sophistication, could affect the decision to cast a so-called sophisticated vote.
8. Unfortunately, we do not directly estimate the effects of perceived chance of winning on strategic voting. The problem is that how one measures this variable is not obvious. Although Abramson et al. (1992) and Blais and Nadeau (1996) use the subjective expectations of respondents, Alvarez and Nagler (2000) and Cain (1978) use the objective expectations (or actual closeness) of the races. Some have observed, however, that how voters arrive at these subjective expectations is determined in part by the information held by them. Thus, it is not surprising that Blais and Turgeon (in press) find voters' abilities to predict who comes in third in a Canadian election are partially dependent on their political sophistication.
9. In elections to Australia's lower house, voters rank candidates by preference, and if no candidate receives a majority, the candidate with the fewest first-place votes is eliminated and a second round of counting takes place. The voters of the eliminated candidate do not cast wasted votes but rather have their votes transferred to their next highest ranked candidate in the second round. In Louisiana, candidates of all parties run in the same election, and if no one receives a majority, a runoff election is held. The strategic problem for parties and voters is that if too many candidates enter the race from one party, that party might split its vote in such a way that the party is completely absent from the runoff election. For example, in a 1996 congressional race in Acadiana, several Republicans split 60% of the primary vote, allowing two Democrats-who garnered only 40% of the vote-to qualify for the runoff ("Louisiana Politics," 1998). In the past, the Louisiana Republican Party avoided such scenarios by formally endorsing the party's nominee, thereby providing a strong cue for Republican voters (Kuzenski, 1997) . However, this process famously broke down in the 1991 governor's race when the State Republican Party's official endorsee, Clyde Holloway, received only 5% of the vote and White supremacist David Duke made it into the runoff as a Republican (Kuzenski, 1997) . In the 2003 governor's race, seven Republicans entered a race that included five Democrats, and before the primary, polls showed that although Lieutenant Governor Kathleen Blanco was on top, the top-rated Republican candidate, Bobby Jindal, was in a statistical dead heat for second place with Democrat Richard Ieyoub. Again, Republicans feared that two Democrats would make it to the runoff, and they would once again be left out because of lack of strategic coordination among party leaders and Republican voters. To avoid this, party leaders began backing Jindal as the preferred Republican nominee.
10. A somewhat lesser but still important concern was the fear that the Green Party's candidate, Peter Camejo, might serve as the Democrat's counterpart to the Republicans' Tom McClintock, drawing support from the Democrat's left wing.
11. We are indebted to Professor Philip Paolino for pointing this out. 12. McClintock supporters might also defect to Schwarzenegger if they believed Bustamante's chances of winning were great. This introduces the possibility that strategic voting can either be positive (defection to Schwarzenegger because McClintock has little chance of winning, and Schwarzenegger is the next most preferred option) or negative (defection to Schwarzenegger because he has the best chance of defeating the least preferred candidate, Bustamante).
13. Our definition of strategic voting could be challenged by those who believe Democrats who preferred Bustamante to Davis and voted against the recall were casting so-called sincere votes based on their belief that the recall process was illegitimate. The analogy would be Democratic U.S. House members who voted against the articles of impeachment in 1998 even though they preferred Al Gore to Bill Clinton. We respectfully disagree with the underlying interpretation of strategic voting and the particular use of the impeachment analogy. Strategic voting is defined here as voting out of line with one's rank ordering of candidates. The reason for leapfrogging a second-or third-choice to the head of the list does not alter the fact that it has been done. In our study, it is quite likely that some Democrats preferred Bustamante to Davis but voted against the recall to express genuine opposition to the recall process. In this sense, their vote is sincere (by an alternative criterion) but nonetheless strategic. We also find the impeachment analogy somewhat off base. Congressional votes are very public, introducing a whole set of incentives not faced by voters, who are shielded by the secret ballot. In addition, the impeachment procedure involves an initial House vote to impeach and then a subsequent Senate vote to remove the president from office. Thus, the relative weight of preferred candidate ordering might vary between the House and Senate votes. In short, symbolic votes, media scrutiny, party pressures, and an array of other factors make comparisons problematic. Still, we agree with the larger point that voters may be voting based on concerns (even political concerns) other than a rank ordering of preferred candidates. And although we disagree with the argument that such an act is not strategic voting, we would (and do) concede that the particular arrangements and incentives surrounding the California recall dictate that one be cautious about generalizing.
14. Most intriguing are Democrats who preferred Schwarzenegger to one or both of the top Democrats.
15. At the time of the survey, conservative businessmen Peter Ueberroth and Bill Simon were still in the race, and their supporters might have reason to cast strategic votes for Schwarzenegger. We include these respondents in our analysis even though they do not amount to more than 11% of the electorate and they never had an opportunity to cast a strategic vote because their candidates withdrew before the election.
